Friday, June 27, 2014

Perky Parrots of the Patent-Haters Club

The nonsensical parrot noises
frothing from the beaks of
our Magnificent Nine ...

could not reasonably have come
from reasonable minds.

And that begs the question:

Where did the nonsensical, patent-related
gobbledygook really come from?


One need look no further than
the amicus briefs of the so-called
"frenemies of the court".


... Parrot hears, parrot parrots:

"Generic" computers and graphic claims that are "yawn-drawn" indeed!

The EFF Brief
"B. At a Minimum, Performance of an Otherwise Abstract Idea “on a Computer” or “on the Internet” [performance stage] Should Not Make that Idea Non- Abstract
In effort to avoid preemption, courts have rightfully found that performing an abstract idea on a general purpose computer, without more, does not make that invention patent-eligible. For example, in Dealertrack, ... The claims at issue here, like those in Dealertrack, Benson, and Bilski, take an abstract idea—using a third-party intermediary to settle risk— and merely tie that idea to a general “data processing system” (in the system claims) and a “computer program ... comprising a computer readable storage medium” (in the media claims). CLS Bank Br. at 48-51. Nevertheless, five judges on the Federal Circuit would have found these system claims patent-eligible. ..."

Microsoft Brief
"II. THE PATENTS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE ARE NOT DIRECTED TO COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED INVENTIONS AND ARE INELIGIBLE UNDER § 101
This case does not concern a computer-implemented invention. Rather, the patents at issue here are directed to an unpatentable business method combined with an equally abstract directive to perform that method using a computer [performance stage]. Petitioner thus misframes the matter before the Court when it seeks a broad referendum on whether “claims to computer-implemented inventions * * * are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101” (rather than being categorically excluded under the abstract-ideas exception). Pet. Br. i. That begs the antecedent question whether petitioner’s business-method-based claims truly are “computer-implemented” inventions. They are not.

There is a broad spectrum of patents that invoke use of a computer, some of which will be unpatentable “abstract ideas,” while others are patentable applications. At one end [of our 1-dimensional "spectrum"], as discussed above, are computer-implemented inventions that involve legitimate innovations in computer science, computerized systems, or other technological or industrial fields. Such software innovations are no different than other types of technological inventions that have long been patent eligible under § 101. There should be no doubt that they, too, are patent eligible.

At the other end of the spectrum are many so-called “business method” patent claims. Such claims primarily involve processes in non-technological fields, like business or finance. Because such claims are concerned with intangible concepts about organizing human behavior and transactions, they often will implicate the “abstract ideas” exception to § 101. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-3230. The fact that a business-method claim may also instruct that the concept be implemented using a computer is not itself sufficient “to transform an unpatentable [abstract idea] into a patent-eligible application of such [an abstract idea].” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2011). Petitioner’s patents fall into the latter category. The claims all focus ... Confirming the invalidity of petitioner’s business-method patents would not, under an appropriate standard, imperil the patent eligibility of computer-implemented inventions that represent true technological advances.

3 comments:

DBH said...

Hear hear

Step Back said...

If you want to "hear" it, click on "Go Ask Alice" at the bottom of the next above post ;-)

Step Back said...

New research article confirms what is alleged here. SCOTUS gets its "facts" from frenemey of the court briefs:
Seeking Facts, Justices Settle for What Briefs Tell Them